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Abstract
Autistic people process gaze differently than typical people, but it is not yet clear if these differences lie in the processing 
of eye-shapes or the belief in whether others can see (perceptual mentalizing). We aimed to investigate whether these two 
models of gaze processing modulate social seeking in typical and autistic adults. We measured preferences of participants to 
view videos of an actress with visible or hidden eyes, who can or cannot see out. While typical participants preferred videos 
where the actress can see through and has visible eyes, autistic people showed no preference for these videos. These findings 
are discussed in the context of perceptual mentalizing and the social motivation theory of autism.
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Introduction
Eye gaze is a powerful and compelling social cue. It can be 
rapidly detected (Senju and Hasegawa 2005) allowing dis-
crimination of complex emotions (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997) 
and intentions (Senju and Johnson 2009a). Direct gaze also 
signals that another person can see out, and this belief in see-
ing something has been linked to mentalizing (Teufel et al. 
2010a). A variety of studies suggest that comprehension 
of gaze and responses to gaze may be different in autistic 
people (Senju and Johnson 2009a). Recently, it has been 
found that typical adults prefer viewing faces with direct 
gaze to those with averted gaze, while no such preference 
is seen in autism (Dubey et al. 2015). However, it is not yet 
clear if differences in gaze preference in autism are related 
to processing the gaze as a physical eye-shape, or to differ-
ences in the belief of whether others can see something. 
The present paper uses a novel paradigm to explore these 
different possibilities.
Models of Gaze Processing
Current models of gaze processing suggest two possible neu-
rocognitive responses to the gaze of another person—a basic 
alerting mechanism and a more elaborate perceptual mental-
izing process. The basic alerting mechanism is believed to be 
implemented by a sub-cortical pathway, whereby an image 
of a pair of eyes activates the superior colliculus, pulvi-
nar and amygdala (Senju and Johnson 2009b), and directs 
attention towards the eyes (Senju and Hasegawa 2005). It is 
thought that this pathway has an evolutionary meaning, since 
in many non-human species direct gaze signals threat from 
a predator (Emery 2000). In humans, neuroimaging stud-
ies indicate that the subcortical regions modulate, in turn, 
the recruitment of the social brain network (e.g. superior 
temporal sulcus, medial prefrontal cortex), which modulates 
the processing of contextual social information (Senju and 
Johnson 2009b). Overall, the subcortical mechanism oper-
ates rapidly and seems to function in the same way for all 
stimuli which match the basic features of a pair of eyes. 
Thus, we could describe this attentional gaze processing as 
being driven by an ‘eye-shape’, regardless of whether that is 
a photo, a schematic drawing or a live person.
More recently, research has also begun to uncover how 
people process gaze as a form of perceptual mentalizing. It 
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is important to distinguish perceptual mentalizing from the 
audience effect. Perceptual mentalizing is the attribution of 
perceptual states to other people about whether they can or 
cannot see something (Teufel et al. 2010a). Instead, the audi-
ence effect refers to changes in behaviour that happen under 
the belief that other people can specifically see me (Hamilton 
and Lind 2016). Substantial research has investigated the 
audience effect, showing that the belief in being seen modu-
lates emotional arousal (Myllyneva and Hietanen 2015), eye 
gaze directed at the observer (Gobel et al. 2015; Laidlaw 
et al. 2011), and prosocial behaviour (Izuma et al. 2009). 
However, only few studies have looked at how perceptual 
mentalizing influences social information processing.
For instance, Teufel et al. (2010b) found that gaze cueing 
effects are driven by perceptual mentalizing. Participants 
saw videos of an actor wearing obscured goggles with differ-
ent coloured frames, and were told that one pair of goggles 
was transparent whereas the other was opaque; participants 
were also told that the videos were live streamed from an 
adjacent room. Results showed that the gaze cueing effect 
was greater in valid trials (i.e. trials where actor’s gaze and 
target are on the same side) only for the transparent gog-
gles. This suggests that the gaze cueing effect was strongly 
influenced by the attribution of meaningful mental states 
to the confederate, and that this only happened when the 
confederate could see through the goggles (see Nuku and 
Bekkering 2008 for a similar study).
In another study, Furlanetto et al. (2016) showed that per-
ceptual mentalizing also influences visual perspective tak-
ing. In each trial participants first saw the words ‘YOU’ or 
‘SHE/HE’ on the screen, then a digit, and finally an avatar 
looking towards the right or left wall of a room (created 
with a virtual reality software). Each wall had a number 
of dots that ranged from 0 to 2. Participants had to judge 
whether the digit was consistent with the number of dots 
that themselves (‘YOU’) or the avatar (‘SHE/HE’) could see, 
respectively. Crucially, this task was combined with the gog-
gles paradigm designed by Teufel et al. (2010b): the avatar 
was wearing obscured goggles that participants believed to 
be either transparent or opaque. They found that reaction 
times were slower when the avatar was wearing transparent 
goggles, suggesting that participants took the perspective of 
the avatar only when they knew the avatar could see the dots 
through the goggles.
Thus, these studies show that perceptual mentalizing 
itself modulates how we process social information from 
eye gaze. Here, we aim to test the relationship between per-
ceptual mentalizing and social motivation, and whether this 
relationship is different in autism.
Gaze and Social Interaction in Autism
People with the Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC) show 
persistent difficulties in social interactions (DSM-5; Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th Ed. 
2013) including the processing of eye gaze. Eye tracking 
studies suggest autistic people make fewer fixations on the 
eyes of actors in a movie (Klin et al. 2002), though this effect 
is reduced for static photos of faces (Chevallier et al. 2015). 
They have also difficulties in understanding the social mean-
ing of gaze duration and gaze direction, and show abnor-
mal recruitment of brain areas that process this information 
(Georgescu et al. 2013; Senju et al. 2005). At the same time, 
there is evidence suggesting that autistic people might be 
less susceptible to the belief in being seen (audience effect): 
for instance, they do not seem to increase prosocial behav-
iour when other people are observing them (Cage et al. 
2013; Izuma et al. 2011). However, no previous research 
has yet addressed perceptual mentalizing in autism. Thus, 
it is not yet clear if differences in responsiveness to gaze in 
autism are due to changes in the subcortical gaze-attention 
mechanism, or due to differences in perceptual mentaliz-
ing about whether others can see something. The present 
paper investigates this issue, in relation to the measurement 
of motivation.
Recently, it has been suggested that typical adults find 
social stimuli and social interactions inherently rewarding, 
possessing an inbuilt social motivation, but that this motiva-
tion might be reduced in autism (Chevallier et al. 2012). For 
instance, autistic participants self-report diminished enjoy-
ment in social situations when compared to typical ones 
(Chevallier et al. 2011). At the neural level, they activate 
reward-related brain areas (e.g. ventral striatum) signifi-
cantly less than typical people, specifically in response to 
social reward (Scott-Van Zeeland et al. 2010; see also; Del-
monte et al. 2012 and; Kohls et al. 2013). Chevallier et al. 
(2012) distinguish three levels of social motivation. First, 
social orienting happens when we give attentional priority to 
social stimuli rather than non-social; second, there is social 
seeking when we make an effort to get social stimuli because 
we like them (i.e. we want them because we find them inher-
ently rewarding); finally, social maintaining refers to the 
development of strategies to enhance relationships with oth-
ers (e.g. be viewed as likeable, cooperative, etc.). For the 
scope of the present study we will focus on social seeking.
A number of studies have found ways to measure social 
seeking behaviour. For example, people will sacrifice a small 
monetary reward to view a genuine smile (Shore and Heerey 
2011), and will press a key repeatedly to see attractive peo-
ple (Hayden et al. 2007). A new measure of social seeking 
behaviour has been recently developed, which attempts to 
quantify how much effort people will make to seek out social 
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stimuli. In this Choose-A-Movie (CAM) paradigm, partici-
pants are presented on each trial with two coloured boxes 
and know that (for example) the orange box contains movies 
of people, while the green box contains movies of household 
objects. They can chose which box to open and thus which 
movie category to watch on each trial. To encourage careful 
decision making, on each trial there are a number of locks 
on each box (one, two or three locks), and to open a box with 
three locks participants must press a key and wait for that 
lock to open three times. This imposes a small but noticeable 
effort cost on that box, compared to a box with one lock. 
Thus, participants must trade-off their preference to view 
a particular movie against the effort involved in viewing it. 
Results show that they do just that (Dubey et al. 2015). More 
critically, the data show that typical adults prefer to view 
direct gaze video-clips to averted gaze video-clips and object 
video-clips. Conversely, autistic individuals prefer object 
clips to direct or averted gaze, and have a weak preference 
for averted gaze over direct gaze.
However, it is not yet clear why autistic people show 
differences in their motivation to view direct gaze stimuli. 
Many differences in gaze processing have been reported in 
autism, such as gaze comprehension (Baron-Cohen et al. 
1997) and attentional cueing from gaze (Senju and Johnson 
2009a). These effects could be explained by differences in a 
basic sub-cortical mechanism sensitive to eye-shapes. Autis-
tic individuals also show differences when attributing mental 
states to others (Baron-Cohen et al. 1985; Senju et al. 2009), 
and seem to be less sensitive to the presence of other people 
observing them (Cage et al. 2013; Izuma et al. 2011). This 
suggests that differences in response to direct gaze might 
reflect differences in perceptual mentalizing capacities. In 
the present study, we contrast these two hypotheses in the 
context of social motivation. Our task also allows us to dis-
tinguish whether differences in social motivation are due 
to active avoidance of eye gaze and social information or 
passive omission of these cues (Corden et al. 2008; Senju 
and Johnson 2009a).
The Present Study
The present study aimed to dissociate responses to eye-
shapes, presumably processed by a subcortical mechanism 
(Senju and Johnson 2009a, b), and responses to the belief 
that another person can see something, presumably related 
to perceptual mentalizing (Teufel et  al. 2010a). To test 
responses to eye-shapes, we contrasted videos of an actress 
with empty sunglasses (no lenses) to videos of the actress 
wearing normal sunglasses. To test responses to the belief 
that others can see, we adopted the manipulation of Teufel 
et al. (2010b), where participants believed the actress can see 
through one set of sunglasses (normal sunglasses, e.g. those 
with blue frames) but cannot see through the other (opaque 
sunglasses, e.g. those with red frames). We counterbalanced 
which frame colour was linked to each belief (can see or can-
not see) across participants. To complete our 2 × 2 factorial 
design, we created videos of the actress wearing sunglasses 
with paper eyes glued over the lenses—typical eye-shapes 
are present in this manipulation, but the actress cannot see 
through. This set of stimuli gave a complete 2 × 2 factorial 
Table 1  Factorial design used for the video categories and sample screenshots of the video-clips
Eye-shape (E)
Visible (+) Hidden (−)
Belief in being seen (B)
 Yes (+) Empty sunglasses (B+E+)
 
Normal sunglasses (B+E−) 
 No (−) Paper-eyes sunglasses (B−E+) 
 
Opaque sunglasses (B−E−)  
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design with levels Belief in seeing (Belief, B+ and B−) and 
Eye-shape (Eyes, E+ and E−); sample stimuli from each cell 
are shown in Table 1.
Taking these four social video-clips, we used the Chose-
A-Movie task to measure which movie participants preferred 
to view. Expanding on the design by Dubey et al. (2015), 
we gave participants a choice of all four movies on each 
trial, with variable numbers of locks to manipulate effort. 
Our primary outcome measure was the percentage of trials 
on which participants chose each movie. Note that we did 
not attempt to persuade participants that these videos repre-
sented a live-feed of another person from another room. We 
took this decision for three reasons. First, we wanted to spe-
cifically test the effect of perceptual mentalizing (belief that 
someone can see something) on social motivation. Second, 
we wanted to remain close to the procedure of Dubey et al. 
(2015), where there was no live-feed manipulation. Third, it 
is not very plausible to have a live-feed of the same person 
wearing multiple different sets of sunglasses at very short 
notice. Thus, our experimental design addresses perceptual 
mentalizing in a non-interactive way: participants know that 
they are not in an online interaction with the actress.
Based on our hypotheses, we can make several predic-
tions. First, if typical participants prefer attributing per-
ceptual mental states because they have no difficulties in 
further social information processing, they should choose 
to view stimuli with empty and normal sunglasses (B+ con-
ditions, actress can see through) over stimuli with paper-
eyes and opaque sunglasses (B− conditions, actress cannot 
see through). Second, if autistic people show reduced social 
motivation because they are not sensible to eye-shapes, they 
will show no difference in preference for E+ and E− condi-
tions. However, if autistic individuals actively avoid eye-
shapes, they should prefer videos with normal and opaque 
sunglasses (E− conditions, eyes not visible) to videos with 
empty and paper-eyes sunglasses (E+ conditions, eyes 
visible). Third, if autistic people show reduced social moti-
vation due to difficulties in attributing a perceptual mental 
state to the actress, they should show no difference in prefer-
ence for B+ and B− conditions. If they attribute perceptual 
mental states but are less motivated to engage because of dif-
ficulties in further processing of this or other social informa-
tion, they should prefer videos with opaque and paper-eyes 
sunglasses (B− conditions) to videos of empty and normal 
sunglasses (B+ conditions). Systematic group differences 
should be reflected in Group × belief and group × eyes inter-
actions. Because the paper-eyes sunglasses are a slightly odd 
stimulus with low ecological validity, the strongest test of 
the claim that beliefs about whether someone can see impact 
on social motivation comes from examining the conditions 
where participants cannot see the eyes of the actress but 
their belief about whether or not she can see through is 
manipulated. Thus, the Group X Belief interaction was also 
examined including only the E− conditions, that is, normal 
sunglasses (B+E−) and opaque sunglasses (B−E−).
Methods
Participants
A group of 25 typical adults and 27 adults with ASC par-
ticipated in this experiment. Previous studies (Dubey et al. 
2015) show that this sample size is suitable to detect dif-
ferences between two groups. Table 2 shows that the par-
ticipants included in the analyses (i.e. after removal of 
outliers; sample of 25 typical and 24 ASC participants) 
were matched on age, gender, handedness and Intelligence 
Quotient (IQ; Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, WAIS-III 
UK, Wechsler 1999a, b; or Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence, WASI-II); note that the ASC group was high 
functioning, which means that their IQ is higher than 80: 
Table 2  Comparison of the 
typical and autistic (ASC) 
samples that were included in 
the analyses
F female, M male, L left, R right
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 and ***p < 0.001
Typical (N = 25) ASC (N = 24) t-test
Mean (SD) Range Mean (SD) Range p-value
Age 32.28 (10.26) 19–58 33.42 (10.18) 19–52 0.70
Gender 5 F, 20 M – 1 F, 23 M – –
Handedness 2 L, 23 R – 3 L, 21 R – –
IQ: full-scale 115.52 (13.61) 93–149 116.42 (13.35) 86–152 0.82
IQ: verbal 116.32 (13.32) 96–150 118.13 (15.10) 91–155 0.66
IQ: performance 111.00 (14.36) 80–136 111.13 (13.35) 80–132 0.97
AQ 15.60 (4.66) 6–22 31.00 (10.27) 10–46 0.00***
ADOS: total – – 8.92 (3.41) 4–17 –
ADOS: communication – – 2.58 (1.64) 0–6 –
ADOS: social interaction – – 6.33 (2.08) 4–11 –
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since both groups were matched, the typical group also had 
high IQ on average. The two groups differed on Autism Quo-
tient (AQ; Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). All participants were 
recruited using an autism database at the author’s institution. 
Recruitment of ASC participants was based on diagnosis 
from an independent clinician. Routine diagnostic proce-
dures include the Autism Diagnostic Observation Sched-
ule (ADOS; Lord et al. 2000) and the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord et al. 1994), among others. 
ASC participants included in the analyses were diagnosed 
as either Asperger’s Syndrome (17), Autism (6) or Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (1). They were also tested on module 4 of 
the ADOS by a trained researcher: seven participants met the 
ADOS classification for Autism; ten for Autism Spectrum; 
seven did not meet the classification for any of them, but all 
seven participants had a clear diagnosis from an independ-
ent clinician, and reached the cut-off for autism spectrum 
on either the communication or reciprocal social interaction 
subscale. They gave written informed consent before doing 
the experiment and were compensated for their time and 
travel expenses. All procedures were approved by the local 
Research Ethics Committee and were in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki and APA ethical standards.
Stimuli
Four different types of video-clips were created. These 
video-clips corresponded to the four categories of a 2-by-2 
factorial design with factors Belief (B) and Eyes (E) (see 
Table 1), which were determined by the type of sunglasses 
the actress on the video-clip was wearing. The four catego-
ries were the following: B+E+ (belief in seeing through 
and eyes visible: empty sunglasses), B−E+ (no belief in 
seeing through but eyes visible: paper-eyes sunglasses), 
B+E− (belief in seeing through but eyes not visible: nor-
mal sunglasses) and B−E− (no belief in seeing through and 
eyes not visible: opaque sunglasses). Empty sunglasses had 
black frames and no lenses; paper-eyes sunglasses had black 
frames and a picture of an eye glued over each lens; normal 
and opaque sunglasses had either blue or red frames (coun-
terbalanced across participants) and mirrored lenses (so that 
participants could not see the eyes of the actress); opaque 
sunglasses also had a black paper glued behind each lens.
During the filming session, we initially recorded eight 
different actors (four female, four male). They sat in front of 
a blue background and the camera was prepared to depict a 
medium close shot. They were instructed to first look down 
and, upon hearing the experimenter call their name, look up 
directly to the camera and smile as if they were greeting a 
friend. They were recorded while wearing empty sunglasses, 
paper-eyes sunglasses, and normal sunglasses (with both red 
and blue frames). Since the lenses of the sunglasses were 
mirrored, the videos with normal sunglasses were also used 
for the opaque sunglasses condition: this ensured that there 
were no perceptual differences in the face between these two 
conditions. The final video-clips had a duration of 3 s, and 
were saved at 600 × 450 pixels.
All 32 videos (eight possible actors for each of the four 
video categories) were rated on trustworthiness, friendliness 
and genuineness of the greeting (see Supplementary Materi-
als S1). We found that one of the female actresses received 
higher ratings than the other actors, for all four video catego-
ries. Her performance matched our requirements for these 
stimuli, since we needed to ensure that social seeking was 
not affected by the actress being too neutral on the facial 
expression. Thus, we decided to only use this actress in the 
stimuli.
In addition to the video-clips, four abstract coloured 
patterns were used as cues for the four video categories 
(Fig. 1a). Patterns associated with empty (green pattern) 
and paper-eyes (yellow pattern) sunglasses were the same 
for all participants. Patterns associated with normal and 
opaque sunglasses were counterbalanced according to the 
counterbalancing of the frame colour of the sunglasses (red 
and blue patterns).
Choose‑a‑Movie (CAM) Task Design
The choose-a-movie task design was coded with MATLAB 
(8.5, MathWorks 2015) and Cogent Graphics. Similar to 
Dubey et al. (2015), participants first learnt that each video-
clip category was linked to one particular patterned box (see 
Fig. 1a). Then, on each trial (see Fig. 1b for a sample trial), 
participants saw four patterned boxes on the screen, and each 
box could have 1, 2 or 3 locks. All possible combinations 
of locks (3) and video categories (4) appeared across trials, 
and each video category randomly appeared in one of the 
four positions on the screen. Participants unlocked the boxes 
by pressing a specific key on the numeric keypad in front 
of them. The key they were required to press was linked to 
the position of the box (one for bottom–left, three for bot-
tom–right, seven for top–left, nine for top–right), and they 
had to press the key as many times as number of locks the 
box had (e.g. if the box had three locks, they would press 
the key three times). Thus, on each trial participants had to 
choose their preferred video category in trade-off with effort 
(i.e. number of locks or keyhits). When a box was unlocked, 
the video-clip with the actress wearing the corresponding 
type of glasses was displayed as a reward.
Procedure
Participants came to the lab to perform the experiment as 
part of a Research Day. They sat in a chair approximately 
1 m from the projector screen, and between them and the 
screen there was a table with the numeric keypad. The 
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experimenter first showed the four types of sunglasses to 
the participants in order to manipulate their beliefs. For 
each type of sunglasses, the experimenter first named the 
sunglasses and then described whether a person would be 
able to see through them or not. The sunglasses were always 
presented in the same order: empty sunglasses, paper-eyes 
sunglasses, normal sunglasses and opaque sunglasses. 
However, for half of the participants the normal sunglasses 
had blue frames and the opaque sunglasses had red frames, 
whereas for the other half it was the opposite. Participants 
tried all the sunglasses and left them on the table. In front 
of each type of sunglasses the experimenter placed a label 
with the name of the sunglasses. Participants then started 
the learning phase, during which they learnt that each video 
category was linked to one particular patterned box. In case 
they forgot the link between patterns and video category, 
the background of the label in front of each type of glasses 
matched the corresponding pattern for that category. Dur-
ing the learning phase participants completed eight trials 
in order to practise how to unlock boxes. Then participants 
performed the test phase, during which they completed 
81 trials (i.e. all possible combinations of three locks and 
four video categories) across three blocks (27 trials in each 
block). Because participants originally performed a mimicry 
task interspersed between the CAM task blocks, the overall 
duration of the experiment was approximately 45 min, from 
which 20 min where devoted to the CAM task (the results 
from the mimicry task will be reported elsewhere). In the 
end of the task participants completed a post-test question-
naire in order to check that they understood the meaning 
of each type of glasses (see Supplementary Materials S2). 
Only two typical participants and three ASC participants 
gave a wrong answer in one of the questions. The two typical 
participants responded wrongly the questions about normal 
(red in the questionnaire) and opaque (blue in the question-
naire) sunglasses, respectively. The three ASC participants 
responded wrongly the questions about paper-eyes (fake-
eyes in the questionnaire), normal (blue in the questionnaire) 
and opaque (red in the questionnaire) sunglasses, respec-
tively. Removal of these participants did not affect the results 
so they were all included in the statistical analysis. Data on 
ADOS scores, IQ scores and AQ scores for all participants 
Fig. 1  a Association between patterned boxes and video-clip catego-
ries. b Sample trial where the participant chooses B+E− condition 
(normal sunglasses): (1) the four options are first displayed; (2) the 
participant chooses which box to open by doing the required key hits; 
(3) the unlocked box is zoomed and the corresponding video-clip is 
displayed as a reward
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was available from previous testing sessions at the author’s 
institution.
Data Analysis
The primary outcome measure for each participant was the 
percentage of trials on which each video was chosen. There 
were four possible video-clip categories, so 25% was con-
sidered chance level. Three outliers within the autistic sam-
ple were removed, since their mean percentage of choices 
for one of the conditions was above 3 SDs from the overall 
mean. In particular, each of these three participants had cho-
sen the same condition in more than 95% of the trials (these 
conditions were empty sunglasses, paper-eyes sunglasses 
and normal sunglasses), which suggests that their choice 
may based on a particular preference for the colour or pat-
tern associated with that video category. Statistical analyses 
were performed for both the full sample and the final sample 
excluding outliers (25 typical and 24 autistic participants; 
see Table 2). A three-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
performed. Belief in seeing (B+ and B−) and Eye-shape (E+ 
and E−) were used as within-subjects factors, Group (typi-
cal and autism) as between-subjects factor, and the measure 
percentage of choices as dependent variable. However, to 
test and interpret our hypotheses we focused on two-way 
interactions between Belief X Eyes, Belief X Group and 
Eyes X Group. The Belief X Group interaction was also 
examined including only the E− conditions, that is, normal 
sunglasses (B+E−) and opaque sunglasses (B−E−). Post-
hoc pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni’s adjustment 
were also computed. Since the analyses for the full and final 
sample showed the same pattern of results, here we only 
report the results for the final sample.
When analysing choice preferences it is important to take 
into account how the choice of a particular video category 
was affected by the relative effort required to watch that 
video. The algorithm implemented in Dubey et al. (2015) 
can only be used in designs with two options, but ours 
has four options. Instead, we developed an algorithm that 
expanded upon this approach, and that is suitable for designs 
with four options. For each participant this algorithm com-
putes a set of values (one for each video category) that best 
explains the choices, taking into account the number of locks 
present on each trial (1, 2 or 3). We call these values ‘choice 
scores’. A more detailed description of how the choice score 
is computed, together with the Matlab script that we used 
can be found in Supplementary Materials (S3.1). Data 
inspection using the choice score revealed that the model 
failed to optimise the values for seven participants, which 
were excluded from the statistical analysis (two outliers in 
the typical group and five outliers in the ASC group; but 
only three outliers in the ASC group were found when using 
the percentage of choices). The pattern of results using the 
choice score and the percentage of choices was the same. 
This indicates that preference for a particular video category, 
rather than the number of locks on the box, was driving the 
choices of participants. Since in the analysis with the per-
centage of choices we can include four extra participants, 
and the pattern of results is similar in both analysis, here 
we only report the results for the percentage of choices. The 
full analysis using choice scores can be found in the Sup-
plementary Materials (S3.2).
Finally, we also tested group differences in the number of 
locks that were opened on average. We performed a two-way 
ANOVA with number of locks (1, 2, 3) as within-subjects 
factor, Group (typical and autism) as between-subjects fac-
tor, and proportion of choice of each number of locks as 
dependent variable (using a sample of 25 typical and 24 
autistic participants). Given that the analyses using the per-
centage of choices (for video categories) and choice score 
yielded the same pattern of results, we expected no differ-
ences between groups regarding the number of locks opened 
throughout the task. Results showed that this was the case: 
both groups chose to open one lock more often than two and 
three locks (see Supplementary Materials, S4). This indi-
cates that both groups put same overall amount of effort to 
see the videos.
Results
The percentages of choices were analysed using a three-way 
repeated measures ANOVA. Results showed that there was 
no three-way interaction between Belief, Eyes and Group, 
F(1,47) = 0.851, p > 0.1, 휂2
p
 = 0.018. This means that prefer-
ence patterns for particular video categories did not differ 
between both groups. Thus, a two-way interaction between 
Belief and Eyes should reveal preference patterns for par-
ticular video categories across the whole sample. Moreover, 
according to our hypotheses, systematic group differences 
in the motivational value of perceptual states (Belief) and 
physical cues (Eyes) should be reflected in two-way interac-
tions between Group and Belief, and Group and Eyes. Below 
we report significant main effects and interactions; descrip-
tives (mean and SD) are given in Table 3, and full statistics 
and post-hoc tests are given in Table 4 (for all conditions) 
and Table 5 (for E− conditions only).
Effects of Video Category
Results showed that there was a main effect of Belief, 
F(1,47) = 23.2, p  < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.331, and Eyes, 
F(1,47) = 16.2, p < 0.001, 휂2
p
 = 0.257: B+ and E+ had sig-
nificantly higher percentage of choices than B− and E−, 
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respectively; however, there was no main effect of Group. 
There was also a two-way interaction effect between Belief 
and Eyes, F(1,47) = 21.1; p < 0.001; 휂2
p
 = 0.329 (Fig. 2a). 
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that, taking together 
both groups (typical and autism), the choice frequency for 
B+E+ (empty sunglasses) was significantly higher than for 
B+E− (normal sunglasses), t(47) = 5.91, p < 0.001, 
 dz = 0.844, B−E+ (paper-eyes sunglasses), t(47) = 5.93, 
p < 0.001,  dz = 0.847, and B−E− (opaque sunglasses), 
t(47) = 5.09, p < 0.001,  dz = 0.727. There was no difference 
between B−E+ and B−E−, t(47) > 0.1. These results indi-
cate that participants preferred the videos of the actress with 
empty sunglasses over any other type of sunglasses.
Effects of group
There was a two-way interaction effect between Belief and 
Group, F(1,47) = 7.67; p < 0.01; 휂2
p
 = 0.140 (Fig. 2b). Post-
hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that the choice frequency 
for B+ was significantly higher than for B− among typical 
participants, t(47) = 5.42, p < 0.001,  dz = 0.774. When com-
paring both groups, the frequency of choice of B+ was sig-
nificantly higher for typical compared to ASC participants, 
Table 3  Descriptives for the percentage of choices of each video cat-
egory
Condition Group Mean SD
Empty sunglasses (B+E+) Typical 45.4 19.7
Autism 33.6 11.6
Normal sunglasses (B+E−) Typical 17.9 14.3
Autism 20.6 8.31
Paper-eyes sunglasses (B−E+) Typical 19.6 11.8
Autism 20.2 7.97
Opaque sunglasses (B−E−) Typical 17.1 12.7
Autism 25.1 8.24
Table 4  Statistics for the 
belief × eyes × group repeated 
measures ANOVA
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 and ***p < 0.001
Belief Main effect F(1,47) = 23.2; p < 0.001***; 휂2
p
 = 0.331
Eyes Main effect F(1,47) = 16.2; p < 0.001***; 휂2
p
 = 0.257
Group Main effect F(1,47) = 0.067; p > 0.1; 휂2
p
 = 0.001
Belief × eyes Interaction effect F(1,43) = 21.1; p < 0.001***; 휂2
p
 = 0.329
B+: E+ vs. E- t(47) = 5.91; p < 0.001***;  dz = 0.844
B−: E+ versus E− t(47) = 0.741; p > 0.1;  dz = 0.105
E+: B+ versus B− t(47) = 5.93; p < 0.001***;  dz = 0.847
E−: B+ versus B− t(47) = 0.627; p > 0.1;  dz = 0.089
B+E+ versus B−E− t(47) = 5.09; p < 0.001***;  dz = 0.727
B+E− versus B−E+ t(47) = 0.281; p > 0.1;  dz = 0.040
Belief × group Interaction effect F(1,47) = 7.67; p < 0.01**; 휂2
p
 = 0.140
B+: typ vs. aut t(47) = 2.83; p < 0.01**;  dz = 0.404
B−: typ versus aut t(47) = 2.55; p < 0.05*;  dz = 0.365
Typ: B+ versus B− t(47) = 5.42; p < 0.001***;  dz = 0.774
Aut: B+ versus B− t(47) = 1.44; p > 0.1;  dz = 0.205
Eyes × group Interaction effect F(1,43) = 3.92; p = 0.053+;  np2 = 0.077
E+: typ versus aut t(47) = 2.06; p < 0.05*;  dz = 0.294
E−: typ versus aut t(47) = 1.82; p = 0.076+;  dz = 0.259
Typ: E+ versus E− t(47) = 4.30; p < 0.001***;  dz = 0.614
Aut: E+ versus E− t(47) = 1.44; p > 0.1;  dz = 0.205
Belief × eyes × group Interaction effect F(1,47) = 0.851; p > 0.1; 휂2
p
 = 0.018
Table 5  Statistics for the belief × group repeated measures ANOVA 
(E− conditions only)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 and ***p < 0.001















B+: typ versus aut t(47) = 0.176; p > 0.1; 
 dz = 0.025
B−: typ versus aut t(47) = 2.79; p < 0.05*; 
 dz = 0.398
Typ: B+ versus B− t(47) = 0.912; p > 0.1; 
 dz = 0.130
Aut: B+ versus B− t(47) = 1.88; p = 0.066+; 
 dz = 0.269
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t(47) = 2.83, p < 0.01,  dz = 0.404, whereas for B− it was sig-
nificantly lower in the typical group, t(47) = 2.55, p < 0.05, 
 dz = 0.365. This means that typical participants preferred 
videos where the actress can see through the sunglasses, but 
this preference was absent in autism. Moreover, typical par-
ticipants preferred these videos more than autistic partici-
pants, whereas the reversed pattern was found for videos 
where the actress cannot see.
There was a marginal tendency for a two-way interaction 




 = 0.077 (Fig. 2c): similarly to Belief, among typical par-
ticipants the choice frequency for E+ was significantly 
higher than for E−, t(47) = 4.30, p < 0.001,  dz = 0.614. The 
percentage of choices of E+ was significantly higher in the 
typical compared to the autistic group, t(47) = 2.06, p < 0.05, 
 dz = 0.294, and a tendency for a higher preference of E− in 
the autistic group was found when compared to typical par-
ticipants, t(47) = 1.82, p = 0.076,  dz = 0.259. Despite the 
absence of strong evidence, these results suggest that typical 
participants slightly preferred videos with eye-shapes, and 
that no such preference was found in the autistic group. 
These findings also indicate that typical participants had 
stronger preference than the autistic group for videos with 
eye-shapes, but weaker preference for videos where no eye-
shapes were available.
E− Conditions Only (Normal and Opaque 
Sunglasses)
The interaction between Belief and Group with the E− con-




 = 0.077. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that 
autistic participants preferred B−E− more than the typical 
group, t(47) = 2.79, p < 0.05,  dz = 0.398. Among typical par-
ticipants, there was no difference in the percentage of 
choices between B−E− and B+E−, t(47) > 0.1 (Fig. 2d). 
Fig. 2  Percentage of choices: mean (filled circle), SE (error bars), 
and frequency of values (width of distribution). a Interaction between 
Belief and Eyes. b Interaction between Belief and Group. c Interac-
tion between Eyes and Group. d Interaction between Belief and 
Group for E− conditions only. Asterisks signify difference at +p < 0.1, 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 and ***p < 0.001
344 Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders (2019) 49:335–348
1 3
Among autistic participants, there was a marginal tendency 
to choose B-E- more often than B+E−, t(47) = 1.88, 
p = 0.066,  dz = 0.269 (Fig. 2d). Although this evidence is not 
strong enough to draw decisive conclusions, it suggests that 
autistic participants may be able to attribute perceptual men-
tal states but have difficulties to process further social 
information.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate how prefer-
ences for seeing a physical eye-shape (processed by subcorti-
cal gaze-attention mechanisms) and preferences for whether 
others can see out (processed by perceptual mentalizing) 
modulate social seeking in typical and autistic adults. All 
participants preferred videos of a person with full vision 
(empty sunglasses, B+E+) to other conditions, but this was 
qualified by a strong interaction effect between Belief and 
Group, and by a weaker interaction effect between Eyes 
and Group. While typical participants preferred to watch 
videos where the actress could see through the sunglasses 
and eyes were visible over videos where she could not see 
through and eyes were hidden, autistic participants showed 
no preference for either video category. Moreover, typical 
participants preferred B+ and E+ conditions more than autis-
tic participants, but autistic participants preferred B− and 
E− more than the typical group. Further analyses includ-
ing only the conditions where eyes are hidden revealed a 
particular preference for the videos with opaque sunglasses 
(B−E− condition) in the autistic group. Although some of 
these results have to be interpreted with caution given the 
marginal p-values and medium effect sizes, we discuss their 
potential implications in the context of perceptual mental-
izing (Teufel et al. 2010a) and the social motivation theory 
of autism (Chevallier et al. 2012).
Eye Gaze and Social Seeking in Typical People
Results show that typical participants preferred viewing the 
videos of a face with eyes that can see through the sunglasses 
to eyes that cannot see. There is also weak evidence that 
they preferred eyes that are visible to eyes that are hidden. 
These results are in line with previous evidence showing that 
typical people will invest more effort to watch video-clips 
of a person making eye contact rather than to watch video-
clips of a person without eye contact or non-social stimuli 
(Dubey et al. 2015). It has also been suggested that, in typi-
cal natural environments, social interactions are controlled 
by the interactive processing of beliefs about what others can 
see and the physical features of eyes (Nuku and Bekkering 
2008). Teufel et al. (2010a) also propose that, when process-
ing social information, there is a bidirectional interactive 
relationship between brain areas processing physical cues 
and the mentalizing neural system. In the context of our 
study, it could be that the co-presence of physical and belief 
cues (i.e. eyes are visible and participants believe that the 
actress can see through the glasses, B+E+) is more moti-
vating for typical individuals. In line with this, we found 
that there was a general preference for empty sunglasses 
when both groups are taken together. However, our study did 
not find enough evidence to conclude that this preference is 
exclusive to typical individuals.
Contrary to what we expected, typical participants did not 
distinguish between the actress wearing normal sunglasses 
(B+E−) and actress wearing opaque sunglasses (B−E−). 
This could indicate that typical participants did not use the 
information they were given about one set of sunglasses 
being opaque but rather relied on the knowledge that videos 
were not live streamed. The lack of effect by the opacity 
of the sunglasses might thus happen because participants 
were aware that the person in the video could not ever really 
see them. Teufel et al. (2013) similarly found that, if typi-
cal adults do not believe a video is live-streamed, they are 
not sensitive to an opaque goggles manipulation. Thus, it 
remains to be seen how much the belief in being seen (i.e. 
audience effect) matters for social motivation in typical par-
ticipants. We found that typical participants did distinguish 
clearly between the empty sunglasses and the paper-eyes 
sunglasses, where the eye-shape is always present but the 
belief in whether the other can see something varies. How-
ever, it is hard to know if this reflects a true effect of belief: 
the paper-eyes sunglasses look very different to the other 
conditions, and some participants reported it was odd or 
scary to see these videos.
Eye Gaze and Social Seeking in ASC
When comparing the typical and autistic groups, we found 
that the latter had weaker preference for videos where the 
actress can see through the sunglasses (B+) and videos 
with visible eyes (E+), but stronger preference for vid-
eos where the actress cannot see (B−) and videos where 
eyes are hidden (E−). These findings support those by 
Dubey et al. (2015), showing that autistic people invest 
less effort than the typical group to see social stimuli (see 
also Scott-Van Zeeland et al. 2010 and; Stavropoulos and 
Carver 2014 for supporting evidence from neuroimaging 
studies). This was also reflected in an interaction between 
Belief and Group: while typical participants preferred 
B+ over B−, autistic participants showed no preference. 
The interaction between Eyes and Group only yielded a 
marginal effect with medium effect size (0.077), suggest-
ing that typical participants preferred E+ over E− but there 
was no preference in the autistic group. If this finding was 
replicated with stronger evidence, it could proof against 
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theories claiming that autistic people find eye contact 
aversive (Corden et al. 2008), since it seems they choose 
B+ and E+ conditions as often as B− and E−, respectively. 
Rather, autistic individuals might not find eye gaze inher-
ently rewarding, so they passively omit any social informa-
tion that eyes are carrying.
When only the E− conditions (normal sunglasses and 
opaque sunglasses) were included in the analyses, there was 
a marginal interaction between Belief and Group: autistic 
participants tended to prefer B−E− over B+E−, and they 
also had stronger preference for B−E− compared to the typi-
cal group. These results need careful interpretation, since 
the marginal p-values and medium effect size of the interac-
tion (0.077) indicate there is not enough evidence to draw 
decisive conclusions. Nonetheless, they suggest that autistic 
participants are, to some extent, able to explicitly attribute 
perceptual states (they relied on the experimenter’s instruc-
tions about the sunglasses to make choices), but may find 
it difficult to further process this or other social informa-
tion. The absence of beliefs and visible eyes might make 
the B−E− condition much more comfortable for the autis-
tic participant, who has difficulties in mentalizing (Senju 
et al. 2009) and in understanding social cues embedded in 
eye gaze (Baron-Cohen et al. 1997). Previous studies have 
shown that high-functioning autistic individuals attribute 
mental states when explicitly prompted, but have difficul-
ties in doing so spontaneously (Senju et al. 2009). It would 
be interesting to test this when participants need to form 
beliefs about perceptual states by themselves (i.e. spontane-
ously): in this context they might find it harder to distinguish 
between B+E− and B−E−, and might end up choosing both 
conditions equally.
Overall, our findings suggest that high-functioning autis-
tic individuals might be able to (explicitly) attribute percep-
tual states of seeing something, but do not have a preference 
for an actress that can see through sunglasses or whose eyes 
are visible. Contrary to typical people (Teufel et al. 2010a), 
it could be that there is no bidirectional integration of physi-
cal cues and mental states, and consequently these social 
stimuli are less valued by autistic individuals.
Limitations
The present results are a promising first step towards a better 
understanding of the mechanisms behind perceptual mental-
izing and social motivation in ASC. However, we are aware 
that some aspects of our experimental design could be con-
sidered as limitations. First, the present study did not attempt 
to convince participants that they were seeing another per-
son on a live video feed. We addressed perceptual mental-
izing in a non-interactive way, such that we manipulated 
the belief about whether the actress could see something 
through the sunglasses, but not whether she could see me. 
There are three reasons that account for this decision in the 
context of our study. First, we wanted to distinguish percep-
tual mentalizing from audience effect, and test its effect on 
social motivation. Second, we aimed to replicate the set-
ting of Dubey et al. (2015), which did not use a live stream. 
Finally, it is very hard to reliably make participants believe 
in a live stream, particularly when using repeated video-clips 
that participants can choose to view. The fact that partici-
pants with ASC seemed to distinguish between normal and 
opaque sunglasses implies that beliefs about what the actress 
can see may be able to impact on performance in the CAM 
task. However, this belief manipulation is limited in terms 
of ecological validity: testing the belief that someone can 
see me can yield findings with stronger implications for real 
world interactions.
Second, the empty sunglasses and paper-eyes sunglasses 
were designed to be matched for the presence of an eye-
shape in the visual image, but not matched in the belief 
about what the actress can see. However, there were clear 
perceptual differences between these two conditions: the 
amount of visual and emotional information was lower for 
the paper-eyes sunglasses. Moreover, some participants 
(both typical and ASC) reported that they found the paper-
eyes sunglasses somewhat scary. This could be a confound-
ing factor influencing their choices, such that the lower pref-
erence for B−E+ when compared to B+E+ would not be 
due to the absence of beliefs, but rather due to preference 
for a full emotional display or to avoid a scary video-clip. 
The best way to create a stimulus with the appearance of 
eye-shapes but without the belief that others can see through 
might be a manipulation of a live/recorded video feed, but 
this is hard to achieve.
Third, the processing of stimuli where eyes are visible 
(empty and paper-eyes sunglasses) and stimuli where eyes 
are not visible (normal and opaque sunglasses) requires dif-
ferent cognitive inferences. In the first case, participants 
were able to determine if the actress could or could not see 
just from the visual image, with no need for instructions. 
However, in the latter case participants could only interpret 
the conditions in terms of the actress’ vision if they first took 
into account the colour of the frames, and then inferred its 
meaning. Thus, it could be that the need of this second order 
inference was too demanding to distinguish between normal 
and opaque sunglasses on a trial-by-trial basis. This limita-
tion is a challenge, not just for the present study, but for all 
studies using a sunglasses- or goggles-belief manipulation. 
An alternative way to manipulate this belief could be the use 
of two different actresses and a cover story explaining that 
one of them is blind: instead of manipulating the colour of 
the frames, a simple symbol indicating whether the actress 
has full vision or is blind could be used instead.
A further possible limitation is that we do not have like-
ability ratings of the actress from the typical and autistic 
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participants who took part in the study. It could be that the 
two groups differ in how much they liked the actress, which 
could be confounding the interpretation of our results. How-
ever, we think this is unlikely to happen because both groups 
preferred to view the actress with empty sunglasses (where 
face is completely visible) equally.
Finally, some of our results show marginal p values and 
medium effect sizes, and this means that they need to be 
interpreted with caution. Replication of these findings with 
bigger sample sizes and more power is needed draw decisive 
conclusions. For instance, a post-hoc power analysis with 
G*Power (Faul et al. 2009, 2007) showed that the study is 
underpowered to detect a 3-way interaction (power = 0.107). 
Testing a bigger sample size (i.e. increase power) could 
yield enough evidence to reliably find (or not) an interaction 
effect between Belief, Eyes and Group. This could clarify, 
for instance, whether the preference for the co-presence of 
physical and belief cues (B+E+) is exclusive to typical par-
ticipants or not.
Future Directions
These findings open up several avenues for further research. 
In particular, it would be interesting to take a second-person 
neuroscience perspective (Schilbach et al. 2013) and exam-
ine social motivation in situations where there is a genuine 
interaction, and actors can look back at participants. For 
example, in a setting similar to Myllyneva and Hietanen 
(2015), who use a liquid crystal window, do participants 
choose to look at an actor who can see them or one who 
cannot? Eye tracking data would also be valuable: Gobel 
et al. (2015) found that, when participants thought their faces 
would be later seen by the confederate in the videos, they 
made eye contact with the high-rank confederate less often, 
and eye contact with the low-rank confederate more often, 
than if they thought the confederate would not see them. We 
believe that the use of settings emulating real interactions is 
key to reliably assess the impact of beliefs and eye gaze on 
social motivation.
Interestingly, in our study one autistic participant reported 
that he would not mind eye gaze on a video-clip, but he 
would feel uncomfortable with it during real life interac-
tions. As it is suggested by the second-person neuroscience 
approach, real social interactions require individuals to 
process, integrate and update a variety of dynamic social 
cues, and they need to do it spontaneously as the interaction 
develops. This is a much harder task than just interpreting 
the beliefs of someone in a video, where only eye gaze is 
modulated. Thus, the relevance of using such settings rather 
than those in which participants only observe the interact-
ing partner spans beyond the study of social interactions 
per se, and can also have implications in clinical interven-
tions. While many interventions for autistic individuals 
are directed at improving mentalizing (e.g. Social Sto-
riesTM; Gray 1993) or learning the meaning of different 
facial expressions (Crissey 2007), we suggest that learning 
to integrate both beliefs and physical social cues might be 
key to enhance social motivation in autism. In line with the 
second-person neuroscience approach, the development of 
intervention strategies that use real-time social scenarios is 
crucial to understand how different types of social cues are 
integrated and how they are updated over time. Overall, the 
use of ecologically valid social stimuli will allow a thorough 
understanding of the difficulties that autistic people face in 
day-to-day interactions.
Conclusions
The present study demonstrates that the processing of beliefs 
about whether others can see and the processing of eye-
shapes can impact on measures of social motivation. This 
modulation is found in both the typical and autistic group, 
but in different directions: while the former prefers videos 
where the actress can see and eyes are visible, the latter 
shows no preference for these videos. This could be linked 
to differences in integrating physical cues and perceptual 
states of other people. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that 
better matched stimuli and ecologically valid settings are 
required, and hope that future studies will address these 
issues. Overall, these findings have implications for a bet-
ter understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
social interactions, as well as the social difficulties faced by 
autistic people.
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